With a new president in office and new prime minister and his government about to enter office, this is where we find ourselves today. Six takeaways as I survey the scene:
First, there is a great deal of anger in Greece – not only at Macedonia, but at each other. There are many accusations flying back and forth. Former Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias is accusing the current government of New Democracy of failures on many fronts regarding the implementation of the so-called Prespa agreement. While Macedonia has been busy changing documents, signs, currency, and much more, the Greeks have been doing nothing. The anger and the accusations will continue to grow.
Second, there is a great deal of criticism of the EU and the SDSM/DUI government – and that criticism is from NGOs, former diplomats, journalists, and signers of the so-called Prespa agreement. Whereas these individuals never really criticized the former government when it was in power, and whereas certain voices in and out of Macedonia – mine included – said that what the former government was doing was going to be bad for Macedonia and for the EU’s credibility, no one listened to us. Now that they are out of government and now that SDSM/DUI is out of government, they feel free to tell the world what they really think which is the opposite of what they thought and said in 2018/2019.
Third, there are many who supported both the so-called Prespa agreement and Bulgaria’s demands toward Macedonia who are, right now, retrospectively analyzing what their support concluding that, perhaps, they were wrong.
Fourth, Ali Ahmeti and his DUI party are furious at not being back in power so that they can continue with their corruption and are threatening everything short of violence (for now). This will continue to weaken Ahmeti and DUI, which is good news for Macedonia, and the region.
Fifth, the US and the EU, for the most part, seem to be fine – for the time being – with the course of events. They seem to understand that, while the new president and incoming government will continue to call the country, Macedonia, they will adhere to the so-called Prespa agreement when it comes to documents, etc.
Sixth, the vast majority of Macedonia’s citizens, regardless of ethnic background, are more interested in what the new government will do on the economy, rooting out corruption, planning for the new school year in September, etc. In other words, important issues focusing on the day-to-day lives of everyone in Macedonia. Issues such as the “European orientation” of Macedonia are not in question – of course Macedonians – and the new government – are oriented towards Europe. The question is how to achieve that and, since the new government has a strong democratic mandate from the people, best to give them a chance with implementing their agenda.
Finally, let me end with this fascinating analysis on X from German journalist Michael Martens (who writes for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and has been covering the Balkans for decades), which is very revealing:
(Macedonian flag emoji) future Prime Minister Mickoski can only be encouraged to reject the conditions of the EU and Bulgaria for starting accession talks. He would be a fool to trust the EU, Paris or Berlin and change his country's constitution for a non-existent “EU-perspective.”
For good reasons. Investing in a EU membership perspective today is like investing in, say, Greek state bonds in 2010. Not a good idea, unless you want to waste time and money.
It is therefore understandable that Hristijan Mickoski, the newly elected (potential) future Prime Minister of North Macedonia, is unwilling to meet Bulgaria's EU-backed preconditions for starting EU accession talks.
Sofia demands North Macedonia must first write its own country’s Bulgarian minority into the preamble of its constitution before it can even begin accession talks. There is good reason to be skeptical in Skopje about this demand. Because this would not be the end.
There is already an entire catalog of (sometimes historically grotesque) further demands which Bulgaria is ready to inflict on its neighboring country. If North Macedonia gives in now, it will only open the door to a cascade of further blackmail in the years to come.
One can therefore only encourage the incoming government in Skopje not to give in. As a responsible leader, Mickoski cannot agree to a policy which leads to a dead end.
His coalition partners will hopefully understand that a dead end is a dead end for everyone, regardless of ethnicity.
Going forward, Greece and Bulgaria, primarily, will continue to paint this as Macedonia going back on its word, Russian involvement, the lack of a European commitment, etc. And both will continue to tell Macedonia, in so many words, “we are in the EU club and you are not so you must do what we say.”
Ali Ahmeti will continue to demand that he and his party be in government and may, still yet return to the violence which brought him into the Macedonian political scene after he failed to split the country in two in 2001. He is a violent man by nature.
The international community, primarily the US and EU, will continue to take a wait and see attitude, choosing to focus on concrete results in the fight against corruption, upholding the rule of law, and in the economy.
For now, let’s give the incoming government an opportunity to do what they said they would do.
Very well written and researched analysis of the situation in Macedonia.